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estate could be limited to take effect at a period of time later than
twenty-one years after the life or lives of any person or persons in
being at the death of the testator, but so long as the lives are in
existence at the time of the death, any number of them may be
included, and the commencement of any specified estate postponed
until twenty-one years after the expiration of the last surviving
life. These estates differ from contingent remainders in this respect, that being substantive bequests directly to the devisees, their
existence cannot be affected by any acts of persons possessing precedent estates. At the time, or upon the contingency designated
the estate vests, and cannot be prevented from attaching, although
"all mankind should join in the conveyance."'
.With this imperfect examination of some of the instances in
which the doctrines of equity jurisprudence have been admitted and
become principles of the common law, we take leave of the subject.
W. E. C.
CONCORD, N. H.

RECENT AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

In the Supreme Court of Ohio-Oleveland District, July Term,
1860.
HENRY HOLMES ET AL,. vs. THE CLEVELAND, COLUMBUS, AND

CINCIN-

NATI RAILROAD ET AL.
1. The complainants claim as owners in equity, in common with others, of a parcel
of land in the city of Cleveland, by boundaries designated; which land originally
belonged to the stockholders of the Connecticut Land Company, which owned
the entire Western Reserve; and that they and their heirs, are the representatives
of such stockholders, and that the lands of the reserve were conveyed to trustees
for such stockholders; that in 1836 one Thomas Lloyd, fraudulently procured a
deed from said trustees conveying the land claimed in this suit, and that the defendants are in possession of said lands, with notice of the trust and fraud. The

' 4 Kent, 270; Thelluson vs. Woodford, sup.
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prayer of the bill is, to set aside said fraudulent deed, dissolve said trust, and
have a partition of said land, and account of the rents and profits thereof received
bythe defendants.
2. The defendants rely for a defence upon the equitable bar furnished by lapse of
time, want of title in equity in the complainants, and upon a dedication of said
land to the public by the Connecticut Land Company, as early as 1796, accepted
immediately thereafter and ever since used in accordance with the purposes of
the dedication. They deny that they are in possession under the title derived
from said Lloyd, and aver that they are in possession under the authority of a
statute of the State of Ohio, in pursuance of a license granted to the city of
Cleveland, and using the same in a manner consistent with the original dedication.

Mir. Birchard and Mr. Afason, for complainants.
X-r. Vinton and Mr. Hitchcock, for defendants.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
McLEAN, J.-The complainants claim in this case to be the owners
in equity, in common with others unknown, and too numerous to be
made parties, if known, of a parcel of land in the city of Cleveland,
bounded north by the dividing line between Lake Erie and Canada
and the United States, east by Water street in said city, south by the
north line of lot 191, and west by the Cuyahoga river, as it run in
the year 1796, and by a line from its mouth parallel with the east
line. They also allege that said land originally belonged to the
stockholders of the Connecticut Land Company, (which owned the
entire Western Reserve,) and that they, and their heirs, are the
representatives of such stockholders; and that the lands of the
Reserve were conveyed to mere naked trustees for the benefit of
such stockholders; that on March 28, 1836, one Thomas Lloyd,
fraudulently procured a deed from said trustees, conveying the land
claimed in this suit, and that defendants are in possession of said
lands, under a title made from said Lloyd, with notice of the trust
and fraud.
The prayer of the bill is, to set aside said fraudulent deed, dissolve
said trust, and have a partition of said land, and an account of the
rents and profits thereof received by the defendants.
. The defendants insist, that the title to all of said land covered
by the water of Lake Erie is in the public, and not in any trustee
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for them ; and as to the residue of said land, rely for a defence
upon the equitable bar furnished by lapse of time, want of title in
equity in the complainants, and upon a dedication of said land to
the public by the Connecticut Land Company, as early as 1796,
accejted immediately thereafter, and ever since used in accordance
with the purposes of the dedication. They deny that they are in
possession under the title derived from said Lloyd, and aver that
they are in possession under the authority of a statute of the State
of Ohio, in pursuance of a license granted by the city of Cleveland,
and using the same in a manner consistent with the original
dedication.
The leading historical facts of this case, are believed to be accurately and succinctly stated in the defendants' brief. "The Connecticut Land Company was organized in Connecticut in 1795, and
became the owner of the Connecticut Western Reserve, and issued
to its stockholders certificates of stock for their respective interests
therein. This title was made to the State of .Connecticut by the
United States, under the act of April 20th, 1800, and was vested
in trustees for the purpose of partition and conveyance to purchasers.
The company caused all its lands east of the Cuyahoga and the
Portage Path, to be surveyed into townships in the year 1796, and
also selected for sale six townships, including the city plot, which
were immediately (except the city plot) surveyed into one hundred
acre lots, and the whole put in market.
In the year 1798, by mutual arrangement between the proprietors of said land company, in pursuance of the original association,
partition was made of all the company's lands surveyed as aforesaid, except the six townships and the city of Cleveland; and the
legal title was secured to the stockholders in severalty. The company, by its agent, continued to control the land in said six townships and the city plot, until December, 1802, when having caused
the unsold land thereon to be resurveyed, they in like manner distributed the same among their stockholders, and reserved the legal
title to each, and in said partition avowedly included all that
remained unsold in said townships and city. In April, 1807, they,
in like manner divided all their land west of the Cuyahoga and
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the Portage Path. Soon after this, it was discovered that by reason
of omission in the surveys, a small piece of land, not connected with
the city or the six townships, had been omitted, and this, called surplus land, was surveyed into lots in the city and in the six townships
which had been under contract and become forfeited. Whereupon at
a meeting of the stockholders of said company, held according to
its constitution, at which they were fully represented, on the 4th
January, 1809, it was resolved, "that the company divide in severalty
among the stockholders, all their property, consisting of notes, contracts, bonds and land, according to their plan of partition previously adopted," and that the partition made should be conclusive
upon the proprietors, and "no after allowances claimed on account
of any error that may have happened in cost, measure or otherwise.
But said division shall be final, unless further property belonging
to the company be discovered." The company thereupon proceeded to make the partition and reserve the title to the stockholders
in severalty as proposed; and thereupon on the 4th January, 1809,
it was voted, "that this meeting be adjourned without day." Up
to that time the company kept full records of its proceedings, but
since which time there never has been a meeting either of its
directors or stockholders up to the commencement of this suit.
The first plot and survey of the city of Cleveland was made in
1796, by Augustus Porter and Seth Peare, who were the authorized
surveyors of the Connecticut Land Company; and who superintended the surveys of the entire Reserve, east of said Portage Path.
This survey is called Peare's survey, and the original field notes
and maps are in evidence. On this map was marked "Bath street,"
connecting Water street with the river, and bounded north by the
lake, and south by lot 191, and varies in width from 80 to 200 feet.
In describing the lots east of Water street, the length of the
lines above the bank only are given; but on the map they extend
to the lake. In March, 1802, the trustees of said land company
conveyed three of said lots, Nos. 1, 2, and 8, lying next east of
Water street to Samuel Huntington, bounding them on the north
by the lake. This deed also recognized the lake as the north
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boundary. And it was also the northern boundary of other lands,
and lot 191.
On December 6th, 1800, the Territorial Legislature of Ohio
passed an act, entitled an act to provide for the recording of town
plots, and in 1801 Turpland Kirtland, being then the agent of the
company, undertook to make a plot of said city, to be made,
proved, and recorded, as required by that act, the effect of which
would be, to vest the streets and other public grounds in trust for
the purposes therein expressed.
Amos Spafford, a surveyor, made a survey of the city, which he
called field notes, and minutes of the survey of the outlines, lands
and squares of the city, for the land company in 1796. Both Peare
and Spafford's plots and surveys, Peare being the first one, have
been recognized from their origin to the present, by the members of
said land company, and the map of Peare was regularly recorded
on the proper record for Trumbull county, by the agent of the company. In the year 1833, River street, being nearly parallel with
the river, was opened and terminated at Bath street, about 140 feet
distant from the river; and thereafter the latter was used as a
thoroughfare from Water street to the river and the lake.
In 1827, the United States in improving the harbor, cut a new
channel for the mouth of the river, running directly north from a
point near the northwest corner of lot 191, and thereby left on the

west side of the river, a small portion of Bath street, perhaps oneeighth of an acre. Immediately after the construction of the harbor, the accretion commenced on both sides of the river, and has
continued to increase, particularly on the west side, until one-eighth
of an acre has increased to seven or eight acres.
After a few years, the accretion so increased as to prevent the
washing of the bank, and it ceased to cave at the intersection of
Water and Bath streets, and thereupon, about the year 1830, the
corporate authorities repaired said streets, and again opened the
connection between them, since which time Bath street has been one
of the principal thoroughfares of the city.
In 1840, in pursuance of authority given by its charter, the City
CounCil caused the exact boundaries and fronts of all the lanes and
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streets of the Cuyahoga river, below Vineyard's Lane, to be surveyed
and ascertained, of which survey a report was made August 4th,
1841; which was accepted, and thereby the City Council established the boundaries and fronts of said streets and lanes, according to said survey, which designated the entire territory between
lot 191, and the lake at Bath street, and fixed its boundaries
accordingly.
On December 21st, 1844, the legislature of Ohio, by statute,
authorized the City Council to lease any portion of the streets
adjacent to the lake and river needed for public use, as docks and
wharves, for a term not exceeding ten years; the rents arising
therefrom, to be appropriated to the repairs of the streets and of
the public wharves.
February 4tb, 1845, a subdivision and plot of the territory called
Bath street, east of the river was made, designating for public use
certain streets thereon, and also certain lots by number, several of
which lots were soon after leased by authority of the City Council,
under the limitations stated in said statute, and possession was taken
by the tenants. They were used almost exclusively for the storage,
sale and shipment of coal. Against these tenants suits in ejectment were commenced, in favor of Lloyd's lessee, which wer defended by the city. Pending these suits, in 1849 or 1850, the railroad companies, or some of those now occupying the land east of
the river in pursuance of the authority conferred by the statute
under which they were incorporated, finding it necessary, in the
location of their roads, to occupy said grounds, instituted the requisite proceedings for appropriating the same.
After the instrument of appropriation was filed, under the
authority of the- same statute, they agreed with the city upon the
terms and manner of occupying the same, for railroad purposes;
and also to avoid annoyance from Lloyd and his assigns, in he use
of such portions of Bath street as they now require for their roads,
purchased out of the asserted claims of said Lloyd or his assigns,
and since have expended over $450,000 in improvements upon said
land, and in reclaiming the same from the lake by means of piling
and filling, and thus the accretion has been greatly extended.
46
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The articles of association did not contemplate a permanent
organization of the Connecticut Land Company, but were entered
into for the better and more convenient accomplishment of certain
necessary and temporary objects, which could not be effected except
by ajoint action of all the proprietors in some form. These necessary objects, but temporary in their performance, were the extinguishment of the Indian title, the survey of their lands and the
partition of them in severalty among the proprietors.
It was the policy and intent of these articles, that this trust
should continue until the partition could be had, and no longer ; and
they directed a survey of the whole territory within the term of
two years, and that the trustees should convey the whole in severalty to the purchasers and shareholders.
The parties to the articles of association, viz. the proprietors, the
board of directors, and the trustees, proceeded to carry them into
execution; the Indian title was extinguished, the country was
surveyed, the directors sold so much of the land as they were required to sell, and in January 1809, all things being now ready,
the proprietors, at a regular meeting, made a final division in severalty of all their lands; and all outstanding claims for.lands sold by
the directors, and in a word, all of their common property of which
they had any knowledge. The resolution directing the partition
declares, that the division then made shall be conclusive upon each
proprietor, and that it should be final, unless further property belonging to the company should be discovered. There is no averment in the bill, nor any attempt to prove, that the existence of the
land now in dispute was then unknown to the proprietors: This
resolution shows, in a very pointed manner, that it was the understanding and intention of the proprietors, that the division then
made, should stand as a full, complete, and final execution and
accomplishment of the articles of association, and of every and all
of its objects, saving only the contingency, of the after discovery of
property, then unknown to them; and that such property, if any,
as was unknown, and which, because it was regarded by them as
worthless, or for any other cause, they did not think it worth dividing, they abandoned or left it to whoever was or might become the
occupier or possessor of it.
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That the proprietors understood this should be a final dissolution
of the company, subject alone to that one contingency, is evident
from the fact that the proof shows that, prior to this time, they held
regular meetings, and that no meeting of the company was ever held
afterwards.
Nearly fifty years have7 transpired since this association was dissolved. The proof shows that a quarter of a century afterwards,
the land referred to was of little or no value. None has been imparted to it by the associates or their descendants. But a very
great and permanent value has been given it, by the terminus of the
canal from the Ohio river to Lake Erie, and by a large amount of
money expended by the United States, and by railroad companies
on this land, in improving the harbor of Cleveland, which last has
caused it to be made the common termini of five important railroads,
which have expended upon it more than half a million of dollars, in
erecting depots, freight and passenger houses, wharves, &c., for the
benefit and convenience of trade and travel.
This final action on the affairs of the Connecticut Company, must
be considered as conclusive. In 1809 the townwas limited, and its
business prospects were small. It was deemed a proper time to.
close the concerns of the Connecticut Company before its affairs
became complicated and its rights were misunderstood or misrepresented. It is not alleged that any part of the matters were overlooked or forgotten. Some things may have been deemed too
unimportant to attract.attention. Some lands, perhaps, that at that
time would not pay the expense of their reclamation. These were
all matters of examination and reflection, and must have been duly
considered. Those only that were unknown to the party could come
before them for review, unless on a charge of mistake or fraud.
Everything else was settled, finally settled. This was understood
and solemnly assented to. Under no other circumstances could a
final adjustment be made. This was the object of the association.
In no other mode could the desired object be ascertained.
There was a peculiar fitness and proprietyin this company adjusting as it did, all matters of account. Their shares were numerous, and consisted in minute pieces of property, in some instances
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scarcely susceptible of division ; speculation had not then got to
work, and a division was not found sufficient. A general interest
was felt for a rising village, and each individual was willing to
contribute what he could, in reason, to its prosperity. It may be
fairl presumed, that there was a disposition to give up the shreds
and patches to the public, for the advancement of the general interest. This was seen in the action of the City Council, and at a
future period, that of the goveinment of the United States, in the
streets and harbor to adapt them to a rising commerce. But the
most persuasive action was that of declaring, that they abandoned
every thing known to the association at the time. And there is
reason to believe, that this was done with the view of imparting to
the public such commercial. and other *advantages as might be
useful.
The entrance of the canal into the lake, at Cleveland, and the
public works on the wharves and the water line of the lake, was at
first gradually extended, and afterwards, rapidly, to meet the growing necessities of commerce.
It is not essential that a public ground intended for public use,
should be formally so dedicated. It is enough if the public shall
take possession of the ground, using it for public purposes, and
shall continue to do so for a long term of years, the public right
will be presumed. This would depend upon a longer or shorter
time, according to the circumstances of the case.
It is a well known principle of law, that every owner of property, whether personal or real, may abandon it. Chalmonally vs.
Clinton, 2 Jac. & Walker, 59; Kinsman vs. Loomis, 11 Ohio,
479. In Corning vs. Gould, 16 Wend. 543, it is observed, that
"a man shall be held to intend what necessarily results from his own
acts." Consequently when property is abandoned, under such circumstances as to leave no doubt of the fact, no one who has taken
possession of it can be required to relinquish it. In Kirk vs..King,
8 Barr, 436, an abandonment and non-claim for seven years was
held sufficient.
Whether there be an abandonment is a question of fact to be
determined by the circumstances of the case. Ward vs. Ward,
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14 Eng. Com. Law and Eq., 414. And when this is done, the
right is extinguished. 1 Brown's Civil and Admiralty Law, 83, 166,
287, 239, 240 and 241; 12 Yes. 264.
Where a person considered an article worthless, cast it away, he
thereby divests himself of his title, and cannot complain if any
other person takes possession of it. The fact of abandonment is
sufficient. Goon vs. Anthony, 11 Ill., 588. Taylor vs. Hampton,
4 McCord, 96, 102, is a strong case of abandonment. Hartford Bridge vs. East Rtartford, 16 Conn., 149; Wright vs. Freeman, 5 Johnson, 46T ; Pickett vs. Dowdell, 2 Washington Rep.
115.
Some of the leading decisions on this question are Beckford vs.
Wade, 17 Ves., 98-9; Barry vs. Bingord, I Cox's Chan. Rep.,
145; Bergen vs. Bennett, 1 Caine's Cases, 19; Prevost vs. Gratz,
6 Wheat, 481. But it is unnecessary to multiply authorities on this
point. It is a doctrine too well established to be controverted.
When the town of Cleveland was laid out and surveyed, the
property in dispute was dedicated by the Connecticut Land Company; the evidence is conclusive. It is proved by both Peare's and
Spafford's maps, by the minutes of the survey of the town-plot ; and
that it was used from the earliest settlement of the town, both for
a street and a landing. This .was established by all the witnesses
acquainted with the town at that early period. This fact of dedication is too plain for contradiction.
The use of Bath street by the public is proved beyond doubt
from 1800 or 1801, down to the time when the travel along some
part of it was interrupted by being entirely cut away by the action
of the lake. Where there is an interruption to the enjoyment of a
part of the street, and as soon as the interruption is removed, and
the public right is resumed, the cause is sufficiently explained.
There is no abandonment of the right, the law works no loss to the
public under such circumstances. The act complained of was an
abuse which the law corrects.
But it is said that this right to Bath street was abandoned by the
City of Cleveland, in laying out a street 100 feet wide, and selling
or leasing the land adjoining the street. This was done under ex-
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press legislative authority. This, it is supposed, the legislature
had the power to do. The idea is a just one, that an act done by
authority of law, must be presumed to have been done for the benefit of the public.
The act of 1 May, 1800, required town plots to be recorded, under a penalty of a thousand dollars. This was done to avoid litigation. Spafford, one of the surveyors of the company, in 1801 resurveyed the streets, alleys and public grounds of the town or city.
He vacated one or two alleys made by Peare, and added the land to
the adjoining lots, and also opened one new alley. Beyond this he
made no change in the streets, alleys and public grounds,.consequently made no change in Bath street. Spafford's survey was
deposited by the company's agent, with the recorder of the county
for record, and was in part recorded by him. The deposition of
Mr. Cafe proves that this was done, to comply with the recording
act of 1800. The minutes and field notes of the survey are found
on record, but the map, it is alleged, made by Spafford is not found
in the records. But this is a mistake; the testimony abundantly
proves, that the authority of Spafford's survey and map has been
invariably recognized.
Under the circumstances, the court will presume this map to have
been recorded, if the fact were not §hown. The evidence that the
map was made and left for record, and was used in all cases when
necessary and proper, and this after the lapse of more than half a
century, by which the surveys of the town have been regulated for
the above period, and on which so many important interests depends, and known too so intimately by every one, is too palpable
to be doubted by any one. No court can stultify itself so as to
question the fact. A mere failure of a ministerial officer to
record a map, is a duty which will be presumed under far less
stringent circumstances than those above referred to. Ingersoll
vs. .Harrison,12 Ohio, 512: King vs. Harvey, 4"Ohio, 52; Marbury vs. Madison, 1 ranch, 161.
The grant to Lloyd does not assert that the grantors had any
title to the land conveyed; it is a naked quit-claim, to what is
declared in the deed to have been an unknown and doubtful right.
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The griantees from Lloyd entered into possession of the premises in
their own right and behalf, and not for or in behalf of the trustees
of the land company, or of their cestuis que trust. The defendants are not estopped from showing and claiming that the legal title
to Bath street had passed from the trustees to the county or corporation of Cleveland intrust to the public, before the date of their
deed to Lloyd; and consequently Lloyd took no title by that conveyance. And if this be so, where is the trust relation between
Lloyd and the proprietors of the reserve.
Suppose the trustees of this land, instead of selling to Lloyd, had
themselves taken exclusive possession of Bath street, under claim
of title, what could they do. They as the dedicators of this street
could file their bill in behalf of the public to correct this abuse;
but they could maintain no suit to appropriate the property to
themselves on the plea that it reverted to them.
In the appropriate language of one of the counsel for the complainants, I would say, "Lloyd is not in as a purchaser from the
original proprietors, those who held the beneficial interest in the
land before the dedication, or those who would be entitled to it, if
the dedication should be avoided. He went to trustees who had a
mere naked trust in behalf of the original proprietors; and took
from them a release of their trust estate. The deed which they
gave would indeed pass the trust estate, it could do nothing more.
Not a scintilla of beneficial interest was passed by it, and if there
should be recovery in.ejectment, the plaintiff would merely stand
as the trustee for the original land company, to hold it as their
trustee for their benefit. He has nothing but a trust. The deed
itself tells the whole story of its inception and consummation."
It is said that an easement only passed by the dedication of 1796;
an easement under the authority of law, remains until the law shall
be changed.
It is said that a dedication, if in written terms, cannot be enlarged
or altered by parol; a dedication may be made by parol, the books
are full of such cases. The Pittsburgh case is an evidence of the
fact, and the Cincinnati common. But where a dedication is made
more than half a century, evidenced by a map and other terms of
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description, which have served as guides fixing the plan of the town,
designating its streets, its alleys and its lots, and which maps and
written papers have, by universal consent, been referred to as establishing, for more than half a century, the demarcations of the
propelty of the town, including the streets owned by the public,
the private rights of individuals can never be doubted by any court
which regards the rights of property as permanently settled.
The counsel in the defence argues, that the property in controversy was dedicated to the public or abandoned; and this it is insisted, is.neither good logic nor good law. The argument, as
understood, was, in the alternative, and was certainly good to show,
that if the property had been dedicated or abandoned, the right
was not in the complainantThe land sought to be recovered is now very valuable, and including the alluvial formation which has been added, embraces
twenty acres of soil above high water, exclusive of streets and the
lake shore. It is claimed as having been dedicated as Bath street
of Cleveland.
The original survey of this property was a street by Seth Peare,
September 16th, 1795. By this survey and map, and the sales made
by the proprietors between 1796 and 1800, it was claimed to have
been dedicated as a street. This is shown by Peare's map and
minutes and the record of the Connecticut Land Company. Happily the original of the minutes and the map have been preserved
in the -form they were when the Cleveland Land Company began
to act upon them in selling lands in 1797. And to this day there
has never been any other survey or field notes made by any one.
Spafford's map made new traces of old lines, and placed more permanent monuments on the ground. In Peare's map a space of lot
191, and west of Water street, and south of the water's edge of the
lake shore, is left unsurveyed into'lots, and is marked on the map,
"Bath street."
A great number of statutes from time to time was passed to
establish and regulate the streets of Cleveland, and certain lots
were authorized to be leased for various purposes for the public
service, and this policy seemed to have been continued for a great
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number of years, where such lots were not required for other
purposes.
In 1841, the Council of Cleveland made an interesting report in
regard to certain streets-in which they say of Bath street, that
all land westerly of Water street, east of Cuyahoga and northerly
of lot 191, bounded southerly by a line south 640 west, was included
in Bath street. And they say, " the committee are of opinion
(Anson Haysen dissenting,) that all the land lying northerly of lot
191, as subdivided, and the northerly part thereof located and
extended northerly to lake Erie is included in Bath street, and is a
legal highway."
In Barclay vs. Howell, 6 Peters, 512, the court say, "where a
part of a strip of land adjoining a river had been used as a way,
and the residue was not in a condition to be so used, without grading, &c., and the public authorities from time to time improved
more and more of it, and the proprietors had made no claim for
thirty years, and their agent declared when the town was laid out
that it was reserved for a street: held, that the jury would be
warranted in finding a dedication of the whole strip, and if so dedicated, the proprietor could not recover." And that an agent in
laying out a town, returns a plan afterwards acted on by the principal, and while engaged in the work declares to the effect that a
certain slip of ground was reserved for a street, are admissible to
prove a dedication of the land to that use.
And in the case of Godfrey vs. Alton, 12 Ill. Rep. 38, the court
say, "when a street is laid out bordering on a navigable water, it
will be presumed that it was intended to be dedicated both for a
highway and a landing. The navigable water is a highway; and
when in contact with this, the easement of a street or highway is
granted, the very location of the latter shows that it was designed
for the purpose of loading and unloading freight, and landing passengers from the water. The dedication of the banks of the water
unites the two easements, each of which is essential to the full enjoyment of the other."
Every one knows that the accretions on the shores of our lakes,
in most cases, rapidly increase, and that they are claimed as gene-
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rally belonging to the owner of the fee. This has long been the
doctrine of our courts, and it applies as well to the civil as the common law. But I am not sure that the doctrine may not have been
carried too far, where the accumulations have arisen, in a considerable degree, from the improvement of the ports and landing places.
In regard to a general commerce, or a more limited one, where the
expenditure is necessarily incurred by the public, it should exercise
control for the protection and interest of commerce.
It may be necessary to inquire how far this alluvial formation
may be followed, when the person bounded by it has been subjected
to no expense, and when it may become inconvenient to the public ?
How shall the limit be fixed? It is indispensable that there should
be a regulation, which should be just to all parties interested in it,
and should protect the symmetry and convenience of the port. It
would seem that where the lot of the occupant was bounded by a
street which formed the water line of the shore, he was limited by
the street, and could not clai, beyond it. But where the street did
not limit the boundary, the owner of the soil is obliged to protect
his shore, and for this purpose he may claim the alluvial formation.
So in regard to the common at New Orleans; it was enlarged by
deposit, and to preserve the commerce of the city, the made
land was protected to prevent the city from being cut off from the
river.
Independently of the dedication of Bath street, extending to the
line of the lake, in 1801, and the abandonment in 1809, after the
surveys were completed and the Indian title was extinguished, the
objection remains, that by the progress of time, the claim had become stale, and not a proper subject of relief in equity. In the
case of Smith vs. Clay, 3 Brown's Chan. Rep. 642, it is said by
Lord Camden: "A court of equity, which is never active in relief
against conscience or public convenience, has always refused its aid
to stale demands, where the party has slept upon his rights, and
acquiesced for a great length of time. Nothing can call forth this
court into activity but conscience, good faith, and reasonable diligence. Where these are wanting, the court is passive, and does
nothing. Laches and neglect are always discountenanced; and,
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therefore, from the beginning of this jurisdiction, there was always
a limitation to suits in this court."
By analogy to courts of law, chancery will apply the act of limitation. In Haven vs. Annesley, 2 Schoales & Lefroy, 638-9, the
doctrine of the court is, "that in cases where the statute does not
afford a direct analogy, the court will proceed according to its discretion, and this discretion will be governed by considerations of
public policy, in view of the circumstances of the particular case."
In a certain class of cases a court of equity, acting on its own original
principles, will refuse its aid under the special circumstances of the
case; and under other circumstances, will give relief in less time
than required by the statute. The chancellor, under ordinary circumstances, will follow the statute. But he is not bound to do so,
but will be influenced by the peculiar circumstances of each case.
This doctrine is laid down in almost all the leading authorities, and
especially in Beckford vs. Wade, 17 Yes. 98-9 ; Barry vs. Bingord, 1 Cox, 145 ; Bergen vs. Bennett, 1 Caine's Cases, 19 ; Prevo8t vs. Gratz, 6 Wheat. 481; Hughes vs. -Edward8,9 Wheat. 489;
Miller vs. Mllntire, 6 Peters, 61; Pratt vs. Vattier, 9 Peters,
405; Bowman vs. Wathan, 1 Howard, 189.
Vigilance is required in the prosecution of claims, and it has been
the policy of all governments to bar claims if not prosecuted within
a limited time.
. More than half a century has transpired since the affairs
of the Connecticut Company were said to be finally adjusted.
All claims known to the company at that time were settled, in
regard to debts due and the distribution of property. Great particularity, it is said, was observed in the exactness of this adjustment. The first and second generations of this large Connecticut
company have gone to their account. I now speak of the shareholders of the original company. But a small portion of them can
now be living. If they had left no other record of their lives and
deaths, we should have looked for them among the memorials of
the dead. But the papers of this suit contain some of the names
of the descendants of the shareholders, if not some of those who
belonged to the company originally.
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It is a well established principle, that a mere quit-claim deed,
without covenants of warranty, does not estop the grantor from
showing that no title passed by such deed, and that, consequently,
by the principle of reciprocity, it cannot estop the grantee from
denying the title of the grantor at the date of the deed. The
defendants, then, are not estopped from showing and claiming that
the legal title to Bath street had passed to the trustees of the
county or corporation of Cleveland, in trust for the public, before
the date of their deed to Lloyd, and that, consequently, Lloyd took
no title by that conveyance.
In their bill, the complainants charge that the conveyance by the
trustees of the Connecticut Land Company, to Lloyd, of the land
now in dispute, was made by a fraudulent combination, between the
paities to that deed, in violation of the trust with which the land
was charged, and with the design of depriving the c6mplainants of
their rights; that Lloyd had notice of the trust, and that the conveyance to him was fraudulent and void, seems to be clear.
The original shareholders never authorized the trustees to make
the assignment to Lloyd, it is believed, in any form, which seems to
be apparent from the deed. They incurred no respoisibility, nor
were they authorized to assume any. The purchaser hoped to make
something out of property which resulted from the labor of others,
knowing that he could lose nothing. The prospect was a prospect
of gain on the one side, without loss on the other. Whether Lloyd
had any interest in any original share in the company, is not known.
Whether he paid anything to the trustees, is not known. The presumption, from the face of the quit-claim deed is, that if any consideration were paid, it must have been a nominal amount only.
More than twenty-seven years had transpired since the final
adjustment of all claims by this company in 1809, and it would have
been forgotten, or rather it would not have been brought again into
view, had not the purchaser's hopes been quickened by a speculation. He is charged with fraud in procuring from the trustees the
deed. Twenty-seven years the claim remained dormant, and there
is no reason why its sleep should be disturbed at this late date. Its
resuscitation now can impart no vitality to the claim so deliberately
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abandoned in 1809, nor can it explain the dedication of Bath street
in 1801; and least of all, can it excuse that staleness which now
rests upon it.
Until 1842, no one took possession of the claim; but at this late
period can the new claimant hope to connect it with the deliberate
abandonment of 1809, when it was disclaimed by the original shareholders.
The case does not rest upon the statute of limitations, in the opinion
of the court, but upon those great principles of equity, which are
exercised under its own rules, by a court of chancery. It is a case
not fitted for technical rules and special pleading. The association
was formed on liberal principles and on enlarged plans. Immense
sums of money have been expended in the construction of railroad
depots and other improvements in this city, whose benefits have
been extended not only through Ohio, but throughout the West.
Having deliberately considered the leading facts of the case, and
the hLw which applies to them, I am brought to the following conclusions:
1. That in 1795, the Connecticut Land Company made a large
purchase in the Western Reserve, and issued to the stockholders
certificates of stock for their respective interest therein, which was
divided into shares ; that this stock was vested in trustees, for the
purpose of partition and conveyance to purchasers; that the lands
were surveyed and distributed among the shareholders.
2. That the town of .Cleveland was laid out, and the plot of the
town was made into streets and squares, and that Bath street was
laid out as the street bordering on the lake, and included the original street on the water line; that it was dedicated, as including the
land to the lake on the north.
3. The articles of the association were designed as temporary,
and that the surveys having been completed, the Indian title extinguished, the shares were distributed among the stockholders in 1809,
and a final settlement of their affairs was made of all matters
between them, and it was agreed that there should be no other
adjustment of their accounts which were then known, and only those
which might afterwards be discovered, should be examined. None
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such, it is understood, have been discovered, and any matters known
should be considered as abandoned.
4. The claim is alleged to be a stale one, growing out of the
beginning of the present century , and will not be aided in equity.
5. 'That the defendants have expended vast sums of money in the
construction of five railroad lines and their depots, at the expense
of near a million of dollars, on land made between Bath street and
the lake, all of which, or nearly all of which, is now covered by
railroads, depots and other buildings, for the accommodation of
commerce.
6. Under these circumstances and facts, I am compelled, by a
sense of duty, to say that I do not think the claim set out in the
bill is sustainable in equity in.favor of Lloyd or his assignees, or in
favor of the Connecticut Land Company. It is therefore dismissed,
with costs.

In the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.
ELIS A PERKINS

VS.

PORTLAND,

SACO

AND

PORTSMOUTH

RAILROAD

COIPANY.
1. A railroad company, in making contracts as common carriers, are not restricted

to the line of trgnsit described in their act of incorporation.
2. And if such a company, in making contracts to carry merchandise to remote
places do exceed the authority, express, or implied, conferred upon them by their

charter, if there is no prohibition, they cannot plead such want of authority
against such a contract entered into by them.
3. And if they, having knowledge thereof, permit their agents to hold them out to
the public as common carriers to places beyond the line of their own railroad,
they are thereby estopped from denying the authority of such agents to make
such contracts.

The facts in this case sufficiently appear in the opinion of the court,
which was delivered by
DAVIS, J.-This is an action against the defendants as common

carriers, for the value of a quantity of furniture received by them
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for transportation. The goods were delivered to the station agent
at Biddeford, who gave a receipt for them, of which the following
is a copy:
OFFICE OF THE P., S.

&P. R.R.

.Biddeford, .Me., August 27, 1858.
Received, in apparent good order, from Mrs. Sarah A. Perkins, 8 boxes, 4 chests,
and 11 packages of furniture, marked E. Perkins, Bloomington, .flinois, which we
promise to deliver to Elisha Perkins in Bloomington, in like good order.
J. S. WORKS,
Station Agent."

The furniture was carried by the defendants to Portsmouth, and
sent thence to Boston, by an arrangement between them and the
Eastern Railroad Company, by which the two corporations mutually
conduct their business. The defendants do not appear to have had
any care, nor to have exercised any control, -directly, or indirectly,
over the property, after it was delivered in Boston. No freight was
advanced, nor any rate or sum agreed upon. It was probably
understood that the defendants were to receive their usual rates to
Boston. From that place the furniture was forwarded from one
point to another, by the different railroad or steamboat companies
on the line, each paying the previous freight, and receiving it, with
their own charges, of the next company; and at the time of the
loss, by collision, it was on board a steamer on Lake Michigan.
That Works, was the general agent of the defendants, to contract
for the transportation of passengers and merchandise from the Biddeford station, admits of no doubt. The only question, therefore, is
whether the company were bound by his special contract to deliver
the goods in Bloomington, in the State of Ilinois. Had the company, or had he for the company, any authority to make such contract ? And if not, can the company plead such want of authority
in defence?
The defendants were incorporated in 1837, with authority to construct a railroad from Portland to Portsmouth, and to exercise their
corporate powers "for the transportation of persons, goods, and
property of all description." And it is argued, that the corporation
being the creature of the law, with no powers but those conferred
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by the charter, its agents could not bind it by any contract to
transport persons or property except upon its own railroad. It is
contended that the company have no authority to become common
carriers on other routes, and that any agreement to do so, being
beyond the scope of the corporate powers, is void.
It is quite clear that a common carrier, if a natural person, may
contract to carry persons or property beyond his own line, and thus
make the carriers upon the connecting lines his agents. In such
case he is responsible for any loss or injury upon any part of the
route. 1 Parsons' Con. 687'; Smith's Mer. Law, 367 ; Parsons'
Mer. Law, 217.
Whether the same rule applies, and to the same extent, to corporations chartered as cominon carriers upon lines designated in the
statutes by which they are created, is not so clearly settled in this
country. In England the law is well established, by a series of
decisions, that the same rule applies to railway companies as to
natural persons. And in either case, if common carriers receive
goods marked to be delivered at a place beyond the limits of- their
own line, they undertake, prima facie, to carry the goods to their
destination, and are bound to do so, unless they limit their responsibility by express agreement or notice at the time the goods are
received. Muschamp vs. L. & P. Railway Company, 8 Mees. &
Wels. 421; Watson vs. A. N. & B. Railway Company, 3 Eng.
Law & Eq., 497; Wilson vs. Y. N. .. B. Railway Company, 18
Eng. Law & Eq., 557 ; Crouch vs. L. & N. W. Railway Company,
25 Eng. Law & Eq., 287.
In this country the rule is different. If a railway company receive
goods marked for delivery at a place situated beyond the line of
their own road, they are only bound, in the absence of any special
contract, to transport and deliver them, according to the established
usage of the business, to the carriers of the connecting line, to be
forwarded to their ultimate destination. -Nuttingvs. Conn. River
Railroad Company, 1 Gray 502; Van ,Santvoord vs. St. John, 6
Hill 157; Bank vs. C. Trans. Company, 18 Verm. 140; 23 Verm.
209; Jenneson vs. 0. &A. Railroad Company, 4Am. Law Reg., 234.
In all these cases it is admitted, or assumed, that a railroad corn-
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pany may, by a special contract, bind themselves to deliver merchandise at a place beyond the line of their own road, and that in
such case, they are bound as common carriers for the whole route.
But in none of the English cases cited, except the last one, was any
question raised in regard to the power of the company under their
charter. In that case this point was presented; and though the
contract was to carry goods to a place beyond the realm, the company were held liable, on the ground that they held themselves out
to the public as common carriers to that place, and were thereby
estopped from denying it.
The same question was raised in this country, in the case of Nofes
vs. R. & R. Railroad Company, 27 Verm. 110; and it was held
that a contract to send barges to a place not on the line of their
railroad, for a quantity of hay, and to transport it from that point
over their road, was within the scope of the powers conferred, by
their charter. Redfield, C. J., the learned author of the treatise on
railways, in delivering the opinion of the court, says, "it may be
true, in one sense, that this is extending the duties and powers of
the company beyond the strictest interpretation of the words of the
charter. But the time is now past, when, as between the company
and strangers, any such literal interpretation of the charter is
attempted to be adhered to."
A different doctrine has been held in Connecticut. In the case
of Hood vs. N. . & .NW. Hf. Railroad Company, 22 Conn. 502, it
was held that a contract to carry a passenger from New Haven to
Farmington by railroad, and thence to Collinsville by stage, was
not binding on the company, on the ground that the company had
no authority, by their charter, to make such a contract. But we
are not aware that the doctrine has been carried to this extent in
any other State.
We are satisfied that the better opinion, both upon principle and
authority, is, -that a railroad company may be bound, by a special
contract, to carry persons or property beyond their own line. In
granting the charter, all incidental powers, which are necessary to
the proper and profitable exercise of those which are specially
enumerated, may be presumed to have been conferred by implica47
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tion. The business of common carriers between different places in
our country is intimately interwoven and complicated; and it is
sometimes of great public convenience, if not of absolute necessity,
that several companies should combine their operations, and thus
transport passengers and merchandise by a mutual arrangement,
over all their lines, upon one contract, for one price. The authority
to do this may be regarded as one of the incidental powers granted
by the charter. In such cases each company is liable for the whole
distance. Fairchild vs. Slocum, 19 Wend. 329; .. & W. Railroad Company vs. Ranna, 6 Gray 539.
And we think that a company may be bound, even without any
actual arrangement with connecting lines, if, by their agents, they
hold themselves out to "the public as common carriers beyond the
.
Railroad Comlimits of their own road. Crouch vs. L. & N.
pany, 25 Eng. Law & Eq. 287. And if such agents so represent
the company to the puclic, in such a manner, or for such a length
of time, that the corporators may be presumed to know it, and
therefore to assent to it, the company will not be permitted to deny
either their own authority, or that of their agents; and, if unless
prohibited by statute, in express terms, or by implication, the company will be bound by their contracts. In the language of Redfield, C.
J., in the case before cited, if the corporators acquiesce in the
extension of the business of the company, even beyond the strict
limits of the charter, and strangers are thereby induced to contract
upon the faith of the authority of the agents of such company, the
company are not at liberty to repudiate the authority of such agents
when their transactions prove disastrous."
It only remains to apply these principles to the case before us.
The plaintiff relies upon a special contract to deliver his goods in
Bloomington, in the State of Illinois. The place of delivery being
far beyond the line of transit under the control of the defendants,
it is not sufficient for the plaintiff to prove that the contract was
made by one of their subordinate agents. The authority of such
agent must be proved, or some facts established which will preclude
the company from denying it.
This might be done by proof of express authority, conferred upon
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the agent by the corporation, or by the directors. For even if the
company had no authority by their charter to contract for the transportation of goods to places so remote, and could have been enjoined
or restrained from doing it, by proper proceedings, they cannot
plead such want of authority against persons so contracting with
them. To do this would be taking advantage of their own wrong.
But the evidence in this case fails to prove that the corporation
undertook to confer any special authority upon the agent to make
such contracts.
If there was no express authority conferred upon the agent, it
might have been implied from a mutual arrangement for the carrying business among all the carriers between the point where the
goods were received and the place of delivery. Where such an
arrangement actually exists, there is an implied authority on the
part of the agents of each company to bind them alL But the
evidence in this case is conclusive, that no such arrangement existed
between the defendants and any other companies for the transportation of persons or property to any place beyond Boston.
Assuming that the agent had no actual authority, express, or
implied, to make such a contract with the plaintiff, are the company
estopped from setting up such a defense ?
It appears in evidence that this same agent had had charge of
the business of the company at the Biddeford station for several
years, and that he had been accustomed to make contracts similar
to the one in suit, to deliver goods at various places beyond the line
of their own railroad, in this State, in Massachusetts, in Connecticut, and in Canada. The nature of these contracts, a great number of
which have been proved, is such, that the manner in which the agent was
doing business, and representing the company to the public, must
have been known to the directors, and to many of the corporators.
By permitting this to be done, and retaining the agent in office,
their assent may be presumed. And though this question of fact is
not entirely free from doubt, a majority of the court are of the
opinion that strangers might well suppose that the agent was acting
within the scope of his authority, and that the company are therefore estopped from denying it. According to the agreement of the
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parties, judgment must be entered for the plaintiff for the value of
the goods at the place bf delivery, less the cost of transportation,
he having paid no freight thereon.

In the Court of Appeals of New York.
RICHARD

X.

HfOE

ET

AL.,

RESPONDENTS,

VS.

JESSE

K.

SANBO.N,

APPELLANT.
1. The vendor of an article of merchandise impliedly warrants that he has a title
to what be assumes to sell.
2. The rule of warranty in the -civil law stated, and its application discussed.
8. Where a vendor, who is a manufacturer, sells an article of his own manufacture
for a purpose and a use disclosed to him, he impliedly warrant

that such article

is free from any latent defects growing out of the process of manufacturing, and
that such article is of a fair and merchantable quality, and reasonably fit for the
purpose for which it was manufactured by him.
4. Hence, where A, a vendor of saws, ordered from B, a manufacturer of saws,
certain saws adapted to a circular saw-mill, which were manufactured by B and
sent to A, and which upon trial by A were found to be unsound and worthless by
reason of softness, and were therefore returned to B ; it was held, that B could
not recover in an action on a promissory note given as the consideration for the
purchase.
5. The common law rule of caveat emptor stated and discussed, and its exceptions
given.
6. The foundation on which implied warranties rest, stated and discussed; and
the distinction between actual warranty, as matter of proof, and implied warranty as matter of law pointed out.
7. The case of Morley vs. Attenborough, 3 Ex. 500, explained.

The complaint in this case was upon a promissory note for four
hundred and sixty-seven dollars and eighty-eight cents, payable to
the plaintiffs, at the Washington County Bank, five months from
date.
The defendant in his answer alleged, that in 1855 he purchased
of the plaintiffs a quantity of circular saws, for the purchase price
of which the note set forth in the complaint, was given; that at the
time of the purchase, the plaintiffs "1warranted said saws to be
good saws, and of good quality," and averred that the saws were
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"not good saws, or of good quality," and were " of no. value."
The reply denied the facts set up in the answer.
Upon the trial, the defendant offered to show that "1at and for a
long time previous to the purchase in question, the defendant was
in the business of manufacturing and vending Page's circular saw
mills; and-had in that business had considerable dealings with the
plaintiffs. That in May, 1855, he ordered of the plaintiffs the
saws mentioned in the answer, for the purpose of supplying mills
made and vended by him, and communicated the purpose to the
plaintiffs. That upon that order, and subsequent thereto, the plaintiffs manufactured the saws in question, and forwarded the same, on
defendant's order, to John Howard & Co. at Port Union, in Michigan ; that the consignees tried the saw, in a circular saw mill made
by defendant and sold to them; and that the saw was unsound and
worthless, by reason of softness, and was returned immediately to
plaintiffs, and by them attempted to be retempered; and was again
forwarded to John Howard & Co., and was found to be utterly
worthless, by reason of softness, and otherwise defective, and the
same was then returned to defendant."
This offer was objected to, and rejected by the judge, on the
ground, that the defendant, under the answer, " could not prove
facts to establish an implied warranty; that such defence must be
specially pleaded," and to this decision the defendant's counsel
excepted. The judge subsequently modified this ruling, and decided
to receive the evidence .offered, except in so far as it was proposed
to prove that the saw was manufactured by the plaintiffs for the
express use of the defendant's mills. Evidence was therefore
given, tending to show that one of the saws manufactured by the
plaintiffs, and sold by them to the defendant, and for which the
note in suit was given, through defective material, or want of being
properly tempered, was so soft as to be entirely useless. At the
conclusion of the case, the defendant's counsel insisted that the
cause should be submitted to the jury upon this evidence, but the
judge refused to submit to it, and directed the jury to find a verdict for the plaintiffs, thereby assuming that there could be no
implied warranty as to the quality of the saws, unlss they were
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manufactured or sold for a specific purpose, for which they had
proved on trial not to be suitable.
To this ruling of the judge, the counsel for the defendant excepted.
The jury found a verdict, upon which judgment was entered for
the plaintiffs, and upon appeal to the general term of the Supreme
Court, this judgment was affirmed. The defendant thereupon appealkd to the Court of Appeals.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
to sustain the defence in this case, it was necesSELDEN, J.-If
sary to show that the plaintiffs had agreed to manufacture the saws
for a specific purpose, and that when tried one or more of them
proved not to be adapted to, or useful for that purpose, then the
rulings of the judge upon the trial might have been right. Such a
contract would be entirely different from an ordinary sale, with a
general warranty of quality, and would need to be specially stated.
But, on the other hand, if upon every sale of a manufactured article
by the manufacturer himself, there is an implied warranty that the
article sold is free from any latent defect growing out of the process of manufacture, then the cause should have been submitted to
the jury upon the evidence given. It is not necessary in pleading,
where a party relies upon a mere general warranty of the quality
of goods sold, to state whether the warranty is express or implied.
A general averment that the vendor warranted the articles to be of
a good quality, is sufficient, and proof of a warranty of either kind
will support the averment. In the view I take of this case, therefore, it is only necessary to consider, whether upon a sale by a manufacturer, of articles manufactured by himself, he impliedly undertakes that such articles are of fair quality, and have no secret
defect arising out of the manner in which they were manufactured.
It may not be possible to reconcile all the decisions upon the
subject of implied warranties upon the sale of goods ; but if we
keep steadily in view the principle which lies at the basis of all
such cases, we shall find that much of the apparent conflict will
disappear. It is a universal doctrine, founded upon the plainest
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principles of natural justice, that whenever the article sold has
some latent defect, which is known to the seller, but not to the
purchaser, the former is liable for this defect, if he fails to disclose
his knowledge on the subject, at or before the time of the sale. In
all such cases, where the knowledge of the vendor is proved by
direct evidence, his responsibility rests upon the ground of fraud.
Bat there are cases in which the probability of knowledge on the
part of the vendor is so strong, that the courts will presume its
existence, without proof; and in these cases, the vendor is held
responsible upon an implied warranty. The only difference between these two classes of cases is, that in one the scienter is
actually proved, in the other it is presumed.
It is obvious, that the vendor of goods would be very likely to
know whether he has a title to the goods he sells. He knows
the source from which such title was obtained, and has therefore
means of judging of its validity, which the purchaser cannot be
supposed to have. Hence, it is the doctrine, both of the civil and
the common law, that every vendor impliedly warrants that he has
title to what he assumes to sell. Some slight doubt has been supposed to be thrown upon this doctrine in England, by the remarks
of Parke, B., in the case of Morley vs. Attenborough, 3 Exch. 500.
It is, however, too well settled, both in England and in this country,
to be overthrown or shaken by the obiter dicta of a single judge.
My object is not to establish this doctrine, which admits of no
doubt, but simply to show that it rests upon the foundation here
suggested, viz: the presumed superior knowledge of the vendor
in regard to his title. The case of Morley vs. Attenborough itself,
tends, in my view, to confirm this position. It arose upon the
sale, by a pawnbroker, of a harp pledged with him as security for
a debt. The sale was made through auctioneers, and a general
catalogue was furnished to the bidders, which "stated on the title
page, that the goods for sale consisted of a collection of forfeited
property." The court held that there was no implied warranty of
title in that case. There was perhaps good reason why this case
should be considered an exception to the general rule. The pawnbroker could not justly be presumed to have any special know-
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ledge in regard to the ownership of the articles pledged. The probability was, that he received them upon the faith of the pledgor's
possession alone, and the purchaser was in this respect upon an
equal footing with himself.
There are other exceptions to the general rule, which have the
same tendency. The case of judicial sales is one. There is no
ground for presuming that the officer of the law has any peculiar
knowledge on the subject, or the tide to the property he exposes
to sale. No ddubt both the pawnbroker and the officer, if shewn
to have knowledge which they conceal, would be liable for fraud;
or if they could justly be presumed to have such knowledge, would
be liable upon an implied warranty. It was expressly held in the case
of Peto vs. Blades, 5 Taun., 657, that the law raises an implied promise on the part of a sheriff who sells goods taken in execution, that
he does not know, that he is destitute of title to the goods.
A very ancient and leading case on the subject of implied warranty of title, viz: Cross vs. Gardner, Garth. 90, shows the ground
of liability to be that here suggested. There the plaintiff sought to
recover againt the defendant, for selling a pair of oxen as his, when
they in truth belonged to another. It was objected, that the declaration neither stated that the defendant deceitfully sold the oxen, nor
that he knew them to be the property of another person. But the
court held the defendant liable, " because the plaintiff had no
means of knowing to whom the property belonged, but only by the
possession." This plainly implies that the defendant had better
means of knowledge ; and upon this presumption the court evidently
proceeded. That this was the foundation of the decision, appears
also from another report of the same case, 1 Show. 68, where the
ground taken was, that "if a man having possession of goods, sell
them as his own, an action lies for the deceit." Now deceit implies
knowledge, and as no knowledge was proved, it must have been
presumed.
In an older case still, viz : Dale's case, Cro. Eliz. 44, the court
decided by two judges against one, that the action would not lie, because there was no allegation or proof that the defendant knew of
the defect in his title. But, (to use the language of Cooke;) "An-
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derson contra, for it shall be intended,that he that sold had knowledge whether they were his goods or not." The ground here taken
by the dissenting judge, that every vendor is presumed to know
whether he has title to the things he sells, is precisely that upon
which the subsequent cases have proceeded, and one which affords
a solid basis for the doctrine of implied warranty of title.
It is equally clear, that implied warranties in respect to quality,
whenever they are held to arise, rest upon a presumption in each
particular ase, that the vendor, knew of the defect. It is easy to
see, that in respect to all that class of personal chattels, which do
not enter extensively into the business and trade of a people, and
which do not pass rapidly from hand to hand, such as horses, cattle,
furniture and the like, the vendor who in most cases would have
had th'erticle for sometime in possession and use, would be very
likely to know -whether it was defective; and a presumption of
knowledge would, in such cases, as a general rule, be both reasonable and safe. On the other hand, with regard to those goods
which are the subject of general traffic, and are. habitually purchased, not for use, but to be sold again, no such presumption could
fairly arise.
This distinction may serve to account in some degree, for the difference between the civil and the common law rule, upon the subject
of latent defects in articles sold. The rule of the civil law, viz :
caveat venditor, was adopted at an early period, and in reference,
as it would seem, rather to those articles which are of general and
ordinary use, than to such as enter extensively into the commerce
of the country; while that of the common law, viz : caveat emptor,
originating in a commercial age, and among a highly commercial
people, naturally took the form best calculated to promote the freedom of trade. No doubt the common law rule is, upon the whole,
wisest, and best adapted to an advanced state of society; and yet
there is a large class of cases in which that of the civil law would
serve to prevent many frauds. Take for instance the articlb of
horses. Few would deny, that as to them it would be more conducive to justice, if the vendor would in all cases be held to warrant
against secret defects. But as it would be impracticable to dis-
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crimate among the infinite variety of articles which are the subject
of sale, the common law applies the maxin caveat emptor as a general rule to all cases.
It has been frequently, but as I apprehend, inaccurately said,
that under the civil law a warranty is implied from the payment of
a "sound price" for the article sold. Although paying a "sound
price" may prove that the purchaser was not, it does not prove
that the vendor was cognizant of any defect. It can therefore
have no tendency to show which of the two parties ought to bear
the loss. Where, however, the price paid is less than the value of
the article, supposing it to be sound, this shows that the purchaser
was apprised of the defect, and that the parties contracted with
reference to it. In such. cases, therefore, no warranty arises. It
is.in this aspect alone that the price paid becomes of importance.
But because the want of a sound price would thus prevent a warranty, it has been illogically inferred, that the payment of a sound
price was the foundation of the warranty. The truth is, that the
civil law raises the warranty, because it presumes knowledge on the
part of the vendor; and the want of a "sound price" prevents a
warranty, because it proves equal knowledge on the, part of the
vendee.
The theory of the civil and of the common law, in respect to these
implied warranties, is entirely different. The civil law holds, that
the warranty enters into and forms an integral part of the contract
of sale itself; as will be seen by referring to Pothier's definition of
a sale, and his statement of the obligation of the vendor to warrant
against latent defects, which he deduces directly from that definition. The definition he gives, seems to be somewhat strained, for
the purpose of embracing that obligation. (See Pothier on Cont.
of Sale, prelim. article, and part 2, chap 1, sec. 4.) But the common law, with, as I conceive, better logic, derives the obligation
from the general doctrine which holds vendors responsible for every
spedies of deception. That this is the true source of this warranty
at the common law, will be rendered apparent by reference to three
early cases, two of which have been already referred to, viz: .Dale's
cae, Cr.. IC)i:. 44; .urnis vs. Le eester, Cro. Jac. 474; and
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Cross vs. Gardner, Carth. 90; 1 Show. 68, S. C. These cases
show by what gradations a strong principle of justice overcame at
length the technical rules of the common law, and forced the courts
to sustain an action for a deceit, without any averment or actual
proof of wilful deception.
It is possible to read even in the meagre record we have of these
three cases, the mental operations of the pleaders at that remote
period, in framing the respective declarations. They were all experimental cases, and probably enlisted the highest legal talent.
The declaration in Cross vs. Gardner,as we know, was drawn by
Mr. Justice Gould of the King's Bench. This we learn from himself, Medina vs. Stoughton, Lord Ray. 593. The object of the
pleader in each case evidently was, to avoid the necessity of alleging a scienter of which he bad no extrinsic proof. In Dale's case,
there was no averment, direct or indirect, on the subject of knowledge, and the experiment failed, the pleader having taken too
great a stride to begin with, but carrying along with him, nevertheless, one-third of the court. In Furnis vs. -Leicester,the word
deceitfully, which implied knowledge, was ventured upon, relying
upon the presumption of knowledge to support it, and this experiment succeeded. In Cross vs. Gardner, another step was taken,
and a colloquium and averment of possession in the plaintiff were
resorted to, instead of any express or implied allegation of knowledge. In this also the pleader was successful.
These are the cases, especially the last, which established in the
English courts, the doctrine of implied warranty of title; and my
object in referring to them is, to sustain the position I take, that
the rule was 6riginally based upon the presumption, that a vendor
knows whether or not he has title to the things which he sells.
That this was so, is manifest from the kind of declaration used in
all these cases, viz: case for a deceit. Precisely when the form of
action was changed, from case to assumpsit, does not appear: but
it certainly was not until after the time of Blackstone; because he
says: "In contracts likewise for sales, it is constantly understood,
that the seller undertakes that the commodity he sells is his own;
and if it proves otherwise, an action on the case lies against him to
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exact damages for this deceit." 3 Black. Com. 165. It is plain,
therefore, that the courts proceeded in these cases, upon the ground
of presumptive knowledge on the part of the vendor of his want of
title.
. It has already been shown to some extent, that implied warranties as to quality, are based, when they exist at all, upon the
same assumption. But this will further appear from some of the
exceptions to the common law rule of caveat emptor. One of these
exceptions which has been generally recognised, is, that upon the
sale of provisions, which are purchased, not for the purpose of
re sale, but to be consumed by the purchaser, there is an implied
warranty that such provisions are sound and wholesome. There
are two cases in our own courts, which show the foundation of this
exception. The first is that of Van Bracllin vs. Fonda, 12 Johns.
468, which was an action to recover damages for selling a quarter
of beef as "good and sound," which proved "bad and unwholesome." There was in that case, some evidence that the defendant
knew the animal to be diseased, before it was slaughtered; but the
court, in giving judgment, say, that "in the sale of provisions for
domestic use, the vendor is bound to know that they are sound and
wholesome, at his peril.
Although what the court here say is, that the vendor is bound to
know the condition of what he sells, yet the subsequent case of
Moses vs. Mead, 1 Denio, 378, which was more elaborately considered, shows clearly that the doctrine rests upon a presumption
of knowledge on his part. The sale in that case was of 194 barrels of mess beef, which proved to be tainted; and the action was
assuredly founded upon an implied warranty of soundness. The
beef was bought not for immediate consumption, but by merchants
for the purpose of being resold. Mr. Man, who argued for the defendant, did not dispute the general rule, but relied upon the fact,
that the purchase was not for consumption. The pith of his argument was in this sentence; "where the sale is by wholesale, the
vendor has no more opportunity of knowing their quality (i. e. the
quality of the provisions sold) than the purchaser."
In giving
judgment for the defendant, the court proceeded upon this ground,
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as is evident from the following language of Bronson, Oh. J. After
referring with approbation to the case of Van Bracklin vs. .Fonda,
he says: "But there is a very plain distinction, between selling
provisions for domestic use, and selling them as articles of merchandise, which the buyer does not intend to consume, but to sell
again. Such sales are usually made in large quantities, and with
less of opportunity to know the actual condition of the goods, than
when they are sold by retail." The implied warranty depiends,
therefore, in these cases, as in all others, upon the question, whether
there is reason to impute to the vendor a knowledge of the defects,
if any exist.
Another exception to the general rule, which has been recognized
in several cases, but with some hesitation and uncertainty, is, that a
manufacturer, who sells goods of his own manufacture, impliedly
warrants that they are free from any latent defect growing out of
the process of manufacture. In regard to the justness of this exception, it would seem, aside from authority, scarcely possible to
doubt. If the vendor can be proved to have had knowledge of the
defect, and failed to disclose it, all agree he is liable. Is it not
reasonable to presume that he who made a thing, which has a defedt
arising solely from the manner in which it is made, is cognizant of
that defect ? Where- the vendor has manfactured the article with
his own hands, the inference of knowledge would plainly, in many
cases, be strong enough to charge him even in an action for fraud.
But if the manufacturing is done by agents, the general principles
of law would hold the principal responsible for those whom he employs. Whether the vendor, therefore, has himself manufactured the
article sold, or procured it to be done by others, if honesty and fair
dealing are ever to be enforced by law, a warranty should be implied. The doubts which have been expressed in one or two cases
in this State, upon this subject, could, I think, never have arisen, if
the courts had kept steadily in view the principles upon which implied
warranty rest. This would also have prevented the confusion
which pervades the early English cases on the subject of exceptions
to the maxim caveat emptor. The rule that upon executory contracts for the delivery of some indeterminate thing at a future day,
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there is an implied warranty that the article shall be of a fair
quality, and merchantable ; the supposed rule, that upon the sale of
a thing for a particularpurpose, there is an implied warranty that
thing shall be fit and suitable for that purpose; and the like rule,
that tipon the sale of goods by sample, the vendor warrants that
the goods shall be equal to the sample, have all been treated as
exceptions to that maxim.
The first of these rules may perhaps be regarded as in some sense
an exception, although the case is not one to which the maxim
caveat emptor, could by possibility be supposed to apply. But the
other two can hardly be considered exceptions at all. When a person, desirous to obtain an article for a particular purpose, but not
being himself skilled in respect to such articles, applies to one professing to be acquainted with the subject, or who by his occupation
holds himself out to the world as understanding it, and the latter
furnishes what he alleges to be suitable ; it is plainly to be inferred,
that both parties understand the purchase to be made upon the judg.
ment and responsibility of the seller. In view of some such case,
one or more of the English judges at an early day, laid down the
broad proposition, that upon the sale of goods for a specified purpose, the law raised an implied warranty, that the goods sold were
suitable for that purpose. In Bluett vs. Osborne, 1 Stark., 884,
Lord Ellenborough said: "A person who sells impliedly, warrants
that the thing shall answer the purpose for which it is sold. "Lord
Tenterdon uses similar language in Gray vs. Cox, 4 Barn. & Cres.
108, and Best, Ch. J., reiterated the doctrine in Jones vs. Bright,
5 Bing. 588.
But it is obvious, that notwithstanding the goods are sold for a
particular use, if the purchaser himself understands what he wants,
and selects such goods as he deems adapted to the intended use,
there is no warranty. There can, therefore, be no such general rule
as that referred to; but whether there is a warranty or not, must
depend upon the circumstances of each particular case. This subject has been placed upon its true basis by two later English cases,
viz: Chanter vs. Ropikins, 4 Mees. & Wels. 899; and Brown vs.
.Edington, 2 Man. & Gr., 279. In the last of these cases, Tindal,
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Oh. J., says : "It appears to me to be a distinction, well founded
both in reason and on authority, that if a party purchases an article
upon his own judgment, he cannot afterwards hold the vendor responsible, on the ground that the article turns out to be unfit for the
purpose for which it was required; but if he relies upon the judgment of the seller, and informs him of the use to which the article
is to be applied, it seems to me that transaction carries with it an
implied warranty, that the thing furnished shall be fit and proper
for the use for which it was designed.'
This extract shows, that these are not cases of implied warranty,
in the ordinary sense of these terms. The question is one of fact,
as to the actual contract between the parties. It is, on whose
judgment and responsibility was the purchase really made? Implied
warranties do not rest upon any supposed agreement in fact. They
are obligations which the law raises upon principles, foreign to the
actual contract; principles which are strictly analogous to those
upon which vendors are held liable for fraud. -It is for the sake of
convenience merely, that this obligation is permitted to be enforced
under the form of a contract. However refined this distinction may
appear, its non-observance has led to much of the confusion to be
found in the cases on this subject.
The same may be said in regard to the doctrine that an implied
warranty arises upon every sale by sample, a doctrine which, with
the most obvious propriety, has been limited by the recent cases in
this State (unless the goods are so situated that they cannot be
examined by the buyer) to those cases, where the circumstances
warrant the inference, that the seller actually undertook that the
bulk of the commodity sold corresponds with the sample. Waring
vs. .ason, 18 Wend. 425 ; Hayans vs. Stone, 1 Seld. 73. In view
of the principles settled by these cases, it is equally clear that warranties of this sort are not implied warranties. They are to be
made out as a matter of fact, or they do not exist at all. To infer
an actual warranty from the circumstances proved, is one thing;
to impute a warranty without proof, is another and different thing;
and unless we distinguish between the two, we unavoidably get into
confusion.
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I will refer to a single case by way of illustration: Jones vs. Bright,
5 Bing. 533, a leading case, and one frequently cited. The facts
were, that the plaintiff purchased from the warehouse of the defendant, who was himself the manufacturer, copper for the sheathing
of a 'ship. The defendant, who was informed of the purpose for
which the copper was wanted, said: "I will serve you well." The
copper, in consequence of some defect, lasted only four months,
instead of four years, the usual time. Best, Ch. J., before whom
the cause was tried, left it to the jury to determine whether the
decay in the copper was occasioned by intrinsic defect or external
accident; and if it arose from intrinsic defect, whether such defect
was caused by the process of manufacture. The jury found that
the decay was occasioned -by.some intrinsic defect, but that there
was no satisfactory evidence as to the cause of that defect. The
court held the defendant liable, but there is no little difficulty in
ascertaining the precise ground upon which the decision was placed.
It is evident that the Chief Justice, when he tried the cause, expected
to dispose of it on the ground that the defect in the coppcr grew
out of the process of manufacture; for he says, in his opinion upon
the motion for a new trial: "I declined expressing an opinion at
nisi prius, but I expected the jury would have found that the
article was not properly manufactured, for the testimony of the
scientific witness was very clear." Still, he does not seem willing
to entirely abandon this ground, notwithstanding the verdict was
against it, for he goes on to say: "At all events, the warranty
given by them (the defendants) is not satisfied; because the jury
found that there is an intrinsic defect in an article manufactured
by,them.
But the Chief Justice seems to have been driven by the verdict
to seek some other ground upon which to rest the case. He argues,
therefore, first, to show that the words, "I will serve you well," constitute an express warranty. He then adds : "Bat I wish to put
the case on a broad principle. If a man sells an article, he thereby
warrants that it is merchantable; that it is fit for some purposc.
If he sells it for a particular purpose, he thereby warrants
it fit for that purpose."
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Mr. Justice Burroughs seems to have taken the most sensible
view of the case. He says: "I consider this as more a question of
fact than of law. The question is, whether the contract was proved
as laid ? It was so proved ; and after Fisher had introduced the
parties, and stated the purpose for which the plaintiff wanted the
copper, the defendants warranted the article by undertaking to serve
the plaintiffs well."
This case has been cited indiscriminately, to prove that, upon the
sale of manufactured articles by the manufacturer himself, there is
an implied warranty against defects arising from the process of
manufacture; that goods sold for a particular purpose are warranted
fit for that purpose ; and even that there is an implied warranty in
all cases of sale, that the goods sold are fit for some purpose.
The case, I think, was properly decided on the ground upon
which it was placed by Burrough, J. It was this case, more than
any other, which has served to create in the minds of some of our
judges so strong a feeling against exceptions to the maxim caveat
emptor, that they have been disposed to reject all such exceptions
without discrimination. Wiight vs. .Hart, 18 Wend. 449; Hargaus vs. Stone, 1 Seld. 73. But if we look at what the English
courts have really decided, instead of what some of the judges have
loosely said, we should, I think, find less occasion for deprecating
their tendency in this respect towards the doctrines of the civil law,
than has been supposed.
But for this hostility, to all implied warranties as to quality, it
never could have been doubted, that where one sells an. article of
his own manufacture, which had a defect produced by the manufacturing process itself, the seller must be presumed to have had knowledge of such defect, and must be holden, therefore, upon the most
obvious principles of equity and justice, unless he informs the purchaser of the defect, to indemnify him against it. In such cases, if
the price pqid is entirely below that of a sound article, a presumption would no doubt arise, as under the civil law, that the purchaser
was apprised of the defect.
In the present case, a portion of the alleged defect in the saws
would seem to have arisen from the unsuitableness of the material
48

SALE OF SAMUEL SHADE'S LAND.

of which they were made. The rule on the subject I hold to be this:
The vendor is liable in such cases for any latent defect not disclosed
to the purchaser, arising from the manner in which the article was
manufactured, or if he knowingly uses improper materials, he is
liable fdr that also, but not for any latent defect in the material,
which he is not shown, and cannot be presumed to have known.
The judgment should be reversed, and there should be a new trial,
with costs to abide the event.

In the Court of Common Pleas-Lebanon County.
SALE OF SAMUEL SHADE'S LAND.
QUESTION OF DISTRIBUTION.

1. A judgment confessed by a husband in favor of his wife, without the intervention of a trustee, though void at law, is valid in equity. In Pennsylvania the
rule of equity is adopted, and therefore such a judgment, when given bonafide,
and for value, will be sustained. A conveyance executed, or gift consummated
by the husband to the wife, during coverture, is valid in equity, and a judgment
is in the nature of an executed contract.
2. Semble; that a wife cannot sue her husband either at law, or in equity, during
coverture, or have an adverse execution against him, but his property having
been sold by other creditors she will not be deprived of her lieu, or stripped of her
security. Therefore, -where a husband borrowed his wife's money, to which he
had no legal claim, and promised at the time of the loan to secure and repay it,
and afterwards confessed a judgment directly to her for the amount, it will be
sustained in equity, against the claims of creditors holding junior judgments, and
the husband's land having been sold on otberjudgments, the money was awarded
to the wife in discharge of her lien.

This case arose in the common pleas of Lebanon county, and the
facts sufficiently appear in the opinion of the court, delivered by
PEARSON, P. J. The real estate of Samuel Shade was sold by
the Sheriff of Lebanon county, and the money arising therefrom
brought into court for distribution. The report of an auditor
shows that a judgment for $600, entered in the name of Elizabeth
Shade vs. Samuel Shade, would, if valid, be entitled to receive
$74, the residue of the fund, after paying prior liens, and that the
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said Elizabeth is the wife of said Samuel. It is not pretended that
the judgment was fraudulently entered, or done without consideration, but it is contended that it is void for want of proper partiesthat a husband cannot lawfully confess a judgment in favor
of his wife, without the intervention of a trustee. The point is not
decided by the auditor, but has been referred by him to the court,
and his report is postponed, as we understand it, to give the other
creditors an opportunity to have the judgment vacated, or stricken
from the records.
. If it is void, it may be treated as a nullity by the auditor, or we
can declare it such, and order it to be expunged. If only irregular,
it will stand good until reversed by the action of the proper parties.
We are satisfied that the judgment entered in this case is not
supported by any act of assembly. It does not come within any of
the provisions of the act of 1848, which was enacted for an entirely
different purpose. The woman not standing in the situation of a
feme sole trader, cannot invoke to her aid the act of 1855. Nor
the act of 1856, as she was not deserted by her husband, but living
with him, and the name of a next friend is not used as required by
the statute. A greater difficulty arises under the 22d section of
the act of the 15th of April, 1851, which was, doubtless, intended
as an enabling statute, but in our opinion, if it has any effect whatever, must operate by way of restraint on the power already existing in married women to take judgments or mortgages, in the
name of a trustee, against their husband. It seems to have been
the opinion of the legislature that without the intervention of a
trustee, " appointed by the court," the wife could not take a valid
security against her husband for a debt justly due her, whereas the
contrary is the well settled law, as we understand it. There might
have been some legal difficulty in a wife bringing a suit for the recovery of her just debt against her husband, even through the intervention of a trustee, without the aid of an act of assembly; but
none whatever in taking a valid security by judgment or mortgage
if voluntarily given in the name of another. We, therefore, find it
impossible to construe this to be an enabling statute, and cannot
believe that it was intended to restrain the wife to the specific course
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pointed out. We must look upon it as a mere legislative mistake
in furnishing a more limited remedy to aid one who had a more full
and ample one before, and shall, in examining this case, leave the
act of assembly out of view entirely, as neither enlarging nor restraihing the rights of femes covert.
The case does not come within the provisions of the statute, as
neither the name of a private, nor legal trustee, was used by the
parties; we must, therefore, determine their rights on independent
principles.
By the common law husband and wife are considered one person;
therefore the husband cannot give an estate to the wife, nor the
wife to the husband. Co. Lit. 187 6. 102 a. So a husband cannot
covenant, or contract with-his wife. Idem. 112 a. 2 Wilson, 254 ;
1 Day, 221; 2 Day, 225. Neither could confess a judgment in
favor of the other, for there would be no proper parties to the suit.
It would be the same as a man confessing a judgment to himself.
This we take to be the doctrine wherever the strict common law
prevails, and the authorities to that effect are innumerable. See
Story's Eq. J. § 1372 and following, and the cases there cited.
It is otherwise in equity. - Nearly two hundred years since it
was held that a gift by the husband to the wife, without the intervention of a trustee, is good in equity. Bunb. 205. And articles
of ageement by which a wife bound herself to allow her husband so
much out of her separate estate is binding in equity, without the
intervention of a trustee. Bumb. 205 ; Story's Eq. J. § 1372 ; 1
P. Wins. 125, 6; 2 Yez. 7; 2 John. Ch. 537.
It was formerly supposed that the name of a trustee was indispensable in all cases of post nuptial settlements, and in all contracts between husband and wife; but that doctrine has been long
exploded. Story's Eq. J. § 1380; 4 Barb. N. Y. Rep. 404; 2
Fonb. Equity, B. 1, Oh. 2, note ;'2 Roper on Husband and Wife,
ch. 18, 151 to 157; 9 Paige's N. Y. Ch. 368 ; 2 Russ. & Mylne,
197, 355.
It must be conceded that no action at law can be sustained by
a wife against her husband in this State, and probably the same
doctrine prevails in all others governed by the rules of the common
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law. Such actions are not only invalid for want of legal parties,
but come in conflict with public policy, which admits of no contest
between husband and wife. 7 Casey, 396; Idem. 450. But a
husband can give a note, bond, mortgage, or other obligation to his
wife, which she can enforce against his legal representatives after
his death, or which her representatives can enforce against him,
after her death. The right of action is only suspended during coverture. 26 Alabama R. 214.
A note given by a husband to his wife for money borrowed from
her, raised out of the sale of articles given over to her -by him
during coverture, is valid in equity, and can be recovered from his
administrator after his death; 20 Ohio R. 518.
Also, where the husband gave his wife his note for money borrowed
of her, and which she had received from the estate of a former husband; 10 Ohio R. 371. Or for money which otherwise belonged
to her. 3 P. Win., 837 ; 1 Atk., 270 ; 3 Paige's Ch. 452 ; 3 Desaussure, 158; 15 Vermont R., 537; 21 Law & Equity R., 556.
These principles of equity were fully recognized by the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania, in Towers vs. Wagner, 3 Wh., 48. In that
case the wife occasionally lent money to her husband out of her
separate estate, and the loan was not evidenced by any bond or note,
but merely by entries in the husband's cash book, and the intention
to repay was only raised by implication. Yet it was held that she
could recover the amount by action against his administrator, and
that the statute of limitations did not begin to run until his death,
as the right of action was suspended during coverture. The courts
of the State of Vermont go perhaps a step farther than our own,
holding, that although there can be no suit at law between husband
and wife, without the intervention of a trustee, yet they may sue
each other in equity. 19 Vermont, 410. They also declare that
equity will, for many purposes, consider husband and wife as distinct persons, and wherever courts of law would recognize their contracts as binding, when made with each other through the intervention of a trustee, courts of equity will hold them valid without such
intervention.
Equity looking to substance, and not to form.
24 Vermont, 875.
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Their contracts, when made directly with each other, if done for
an honest purpose, and such as equity will approve, are held binding
in Maryland. 1 Md. Ch. Decisions, 523. And gifts made directly
from the husband to the wife, when not done in fraud of creditors,
are binding. 2 Md. Ch. Decisions, 353.
A deed made directly from a husband to his wife, if honest, is
valid in equity, and will be sustained against himself, his heirs, and
assigns. 28 Mississippi R., 717 ; 24 Id., 181 ; 25 Id., 166.
He may make to her a valid bill of sale of personal property.
7 Texas R., 576.
Where a husband endorsed a negotiable note over to his wife, and
she received it bona fide, in the usual course of business, it was held
in Maine, that she stood in the light of any other indorsee.
38 Maine R., 68; 84 Id., 540. And this independent of any
statute.
It was held in Massachusetts, that her indorsement in her own
name, of a note drawn payable to the wife, passed the legal title,
her husband assenting. 10 Cushing, 291. And a deposit in bank,
by the husband, in the name of the wife, is a valid gift to her of
the money. 6 Cushing, 20.
If a wife is obliged to sue her husband, in order to obtain her
separate estate, she must resort to a court of equity. But should
she obtain possession of her separate property, she has a right to
retain it, and is considered, for every purpose, both the legal and
equitable owner; 16 Alabama R., 490; 3 Atk., 478; 3 Wend. 474;
1 Yes. Jr., 278 ; 9 Id., 486 ; 2 Ves. Sr., 452. In the present case
the wife claims that her husband's property was converted into
money without her intervention, and as the possession was cast on
her, she has the right to retain it, and unless permitted so to do,
her claim will be lost forever.
A post nuptial settlement by a husband, on his wife, will be sustained, where the consideration is property received from her.
16 Alabama, 489; 2 Roper on Husband and Wife, 227; Reeves'
Domestic Relations, 166; 10 Yes., 146; 7 John Ch., 57. And a
voluntary settlement, made by one who was not indebted at the time,
was held good as against subsequent creditors. 8 Wheaton, 229.
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And was also sustained as against creditors, although the husband
was then insolvent, where the money settled had been received from
the wife's father for the benefit of his daughter. 4 Dal. 806 ; in
note. A post-nuptial contract between husband and wife, without
the intervention of a trustee, though void at law, is good in equity,
If without value, is void as to creditors. If for value received from
the wife, is valid. Duvffy vs. The Insurance Company, 8 W. & S.,
413. It is also decided in that case, at p. 433, that a husband and
wife can, in Pennsylvania, make a valid contract with each other
witifout the intervention of a trustee. The same principle is
asserted in 6 Wh., 571. And for many purposes the husband is
considered a trustee for his wife, 6 S. & R. 467. The true intent
of the parties will be carried into effect in equity, without regard to
form, and a contract is generally valid between husband and wife,
without the intervention of a trustee. 1 P. Win. 125; 6 Id. 264 ;
2 Vernon, 689; Story's Eq. J. § 1373. All of these cases and
-principles are cited with approbation by our Supreme Court, in
8 W. & S. 433.
A reasonable gift by a husband to his wife, is sustained in equity
without using the name of a trustee; and where a husband had'placed
a large amount of money in a chest, for the use of his wife, and
always called it hers, the gift was held valid by Gibson, Ch. J.
Herr's appeal, 5 W. & S. 494. This case is spoken of with high
approbation by the Virginia Court of Appeals. 10 Grattan, 259.
If a husband has permitted his wife to acquire property by her own
labor, or by a gift from him to her, it is good against his subsequent
creditors, without the intervention of a trustee. 5 Barr 154. And
although at law there can be no valid contract between husband and
wife, without using the name of a trustee, yet, when fair and reasonable, it will be sustained in equity. 3 Barr, 100.
A wife may purchase land without her husband's assent; and
although he may afterwards dissent, the title is in her in the meantime. I Harris, 355. It requires an express dissent to deprive her
of it. From all of the foregoing decisions and authorities we take
it to be clearly settled that a husband may sell, give, mortgage, or
transfer any of his property, real, personal, or mixed,.directly to his
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wife, without the intervention of a trustee, and that he may assign
to her his choses in action, in like manner, and such acts will be held
good and valid in courts of equity, and that the courts of our State,
have, on that subject, fully adopted the principles of equity. Nor
do weconsider that the cases decided in Pennsylvania, showing that
our courts will not sustain actions at law between husband and wife,
militate in anywise with the equity doctrine. Those actions were
attempted to be supported under the statutes relating to- married
women, and the acts of assembly, when fully and fairly interpreted,
give no such rights as were supposed, and above all were nod intended to encourage litigation between husbhnd and wife.
I ifost cordially concur in all that has been said by the Supreme
Court on that subject, and also as to the policy and effect of the acts
generally ; but there has been no intention, or attempt, to interfere
with the principles of equity, as established by the earlier decisions.
The whole scope and object of the various acts of assembly cited, was
to enlarge the power of married women, protect their property from
their husband's creditors, give themselves more full and ample
authority over it, and enable them to deal more freely and safely
with their husbands. For the courts so t6 interpret these laws as
to limit the action of femes covert, and take away the authority
and rights previously recognized and sustained in equity, would be
to disregard and pervert the manifest intention of the legislature,
by changing, enlarging and enabling, into limiting and restraining
statutes. I am not prepared to say that our courts would sustain a
bill in chancery by the wife against the husband, to oblige him to
comply with his contract made directly with her, without the intervention of a trustee, even where the case might come within the
limited chancery jurisdiction conferred by the legislature. But I
consider it the settled law of this State that a gift or grant consummated and perfected by deed- or delivery, will be held valid,
without the name of any third person being used in the grant or
conveyance. The question then arises, is a judgment an executed
obligation, or is it only executory ? A contract to convey, a bond,
or promissory note, can only be enforced by action, and the right
to sustain it is suspended during coverture. A deed of land, a gift
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of a chattel, or a mortgage, take effect immediately, without further
proceeding, and are treated as executed, vesting an immediate
interest. A judgment, which is considered the end of the law, gives,
not a right of action, but as we conceive, an immediate vested interest, and must be held to take effect presently. It is true that such
a gift may not be available generally, without the aid of an execution, which our courts would scarcely permit to be issued by the
wife against the husband during coverture, if resisted by him, such
acts of hostility being against legal policy; with his consent it could
be lawfully awarded. After his death it would go against his legal
representatives. Where the wife can avail herself of her judgment,
without adverse process against her husband, I am not aware of any
technical rule which stands between her and her right; therefore
when a sale of the land, on which the wife's judgment is a lien, is
made by another creditor, no good reason can be presented which
will deprive her of her money. Should the claim not be allowed, it
might be lost forever, as the land would be discharged of the lien,
and her security gone; although on the death of the husband she
would have a right of action even on a mere personal obligation.
On this motion to strike off the judgment, for want of proper partiesn
it is fair to presume that it was honestly and bona fide entered, for
value, and as the application does not come from the husband, that
it still has his sanction and approbation. It can only be expunged
from the record because it is void, not for irregularity, of which
none but the parties can complain. Whilst the gift, grant, or confession of judgment by a feme covert is void, whether in favor of
her husband or another, for want of power in her, yet as the husband is under no legal disability the objection to his act is purely
technical.
We are of the opinion that this judgment, if entered in good faith,
would be sustained in equity; and therefore should not be set aside
in Pennsylvania, .where the rights of the parties are regulated and
governed by equity principles.
We must next consider whether the judgment was entered for
value, for if merely voluntary, it is void as to creditors. The evidence shows that Mrs. Shade had a separate estate coming from her

